Allied health providers and pricing controls: independent providers that employ, train, and supervise staff are caught in the middle, and might not survive (and the NDIA knows it)

Calm, measured, and constructive: my mantra as I sat down to read the Final Pricing Report: 2025 of the Independent Pricing Committee (IPC) (released on 11 June). I wanted to understand why things seem so bleak for so many independent allied health providers right now. Here’s what I learned (including report page references so you can check for yourself):  

A. Recent pricing cap freezes were designed explicitly to put downward pressure on prices. But they haven’t worked and are beginning to put the ongoing viability of some providers at risk (p 32).

B. Six years of frozen pricing limits have forced the provider market to split into three sub-markets (p 42):

1. Sole clinicians/traders with no staff and minimal overheads/costs.
2. Large volume providers, often backed by investors and strong balance sheets, who can operate efficiently at scale.
3. Specialised and clinically-oriented providers who “employ staff and have [compared to sole traders] more overheads associated with clinical governance, oversight and supervision, and undertake more training and development of staff” (p39).   

C. In theory, pricing controls should not be used to favour or punish any type of provider: Pricing arrangements should not be used to favour or target any particular organisational or operational model (p 9). The IPC is “not suggesting the [NDIA] should be targeting any one market structure with respect to the contributions of small versus large providers, for-profit versus not-for-profit providers, or registered versus unregistered providers” (p 44).  

D. In practice, the IPC and the NDIA know that pricing controls are punishing smaller independent clinics that employ, train, supervise, and employ staff: “The financial viability of these service providers may be put at risk under singular time-based price caps. These alternative organisational delivery models can also be expected to struggle to attract resources (practitioners, administrative stage, investors) further challenging their ongoing viability” (p 39-40).

E. Why this matters:

Therapy supports play a crucial role in achieving the NDIS’s objectives. More than 60% of participants use therapy supports (p 62-63).  

The structure of the provider market determines participant choice and control: “If the Scheme’s objective is to ensure the availability of a wide mix of reasonable and necessary supports – and the availability of those supports depends on the supply-side of the market – and the structure of the supply side of the market depends on the structure of administered price caps, then the approach to setting those prices must be guided by the objective of promoting a market structure that supports the availability of a wide mix of services” (pp 43-44). 

Ultimately, participants care about much more than price: Geographic proximity, rapport with the therapist, therapist reliability and openness, the reputation of  the provider and the therapist matter more to participants than price (pp 5, 38).

With current policy settings, independent clinic owners who employ staff may have no option but to downsize and/or exit the NDIS, reducing both competition for remaining providers, and participant choice and control. This is because independent clinics can’t compete for much longer with:

1. large volume providers who “will be able to attract practitioners with terms and conditions of work that smaller providers, or providers or more varied and complicated services may find difficult to match” (p40) and can afford to trade through periods of declining profitability because of the “growth in the balance sheet of many providers” and by “drawing upon their stronger asset base to meet cash flow challenges” (pp 33-34); and
2. sole traders who can deliver base services with very minimal overheads (because they don’t need to invest in physical clinics, or train or supervise staff) (p 39). 

F. Limitations: The report is limited to pricing and makes no recommendations (pp 11, 18). The IPC admits that provider consultation was limited “to avoid duplication and additional burden on providers given the short time that was available to the IPC to consult” (p 20). Consistent with the Annual Pricing Review, it posits a differential pricing framework of some kind to distinguish different types of services, including (undefined) standard and higher value services (p 7-8). It also suggests reforms to increase price and service transparency (e.g. a price comparator and a “digital supermarket” of providers) (p 9-10).

G. Were independent clinic owners heard? The reference list at the back of the report is skewed notably toward larger providers (pp 96 et seq.), which might explain why the IPC’s reporting of “provider submissions” reflect, in the main, the position of large registered providers (e.g. pp 33-34, 65-66). 

Bottom line:

NDIS participants – rightly – value choice and control over the allied health providers and therapists they work with. Participants choose providers for lots of reasons other than price. We hope there is a future for viable independent clinics to provide personalised, high quality services to participants and to employ, train and supervise the next generation of therapists. But, right now, I wouldn’t bank on it.

Read more: Independent Pricing Committee – Final Pricing Report: 2025